A fundamental problem in economics is determining how agreements are reached in situations where the parties have some market power. Of particular interest are questions of efficiency and distribution:
delay agreement, and so will propose attractive terms of trade that the other is likely to accept early in the bargaining process. On the other hand, high-cost sellers and low-valuation buyers will prefer to wait for better terms of trade. Static games must use a positive probability of disagreement to ensure incentive compatibility, where the probability of disagreement increases as the gains from trade shrink. The advantage of delaying agreement rather than forbidding agreement is that mechanisms can be constructed in which negotiations continue so long as each bargainer expects positive gains. Thus, the bargaining will not end in a state in which it is common knowledge that the players want to renege on their agreed-upon outcome.
Two approaches can be taken in the analysis of perfect bargaining games. The first approach is to examine specific extensive-form games, which determine the set of actions available to the players over time. Intrinsic to any bargaining process is the notion of offers and replies: Bargaining consists of a sequence of offers and decisions to accept or reject these offers. Who makes the offers; the time between offers, responses, and counteroffers; and the possibilities for commitment are determined by the underlying communication technology present in the bargaining setting. This communication technology will imply, in part, a particular bargaining game in extensive form. Cramton (1984) , Sobel and Takahashi (1983) , and Fudenberg, Levine, and Tirole (Chapter 5 in this volume) illustrate the analysis of particular extensive forms that are perfect bargaining games.
The second approach, and the one adopted in this chapter, is to analyze a general direct revelation game, which maps the players' beliefs into bargaining outcomes. An important distinction between direct revelation games and strategic games is that the direct revelation game does not explicitly model the process of bargaining. The sequence of offers and replies that eventually leads to an outcome is not studied in the direct revelation game as it is in strategic games. However, embedded in each sequential bargaining mechanism is a particular form of learning behavior, which can be analyzed. In addition, much can be learned about how information and impatience influence the efficiency of the bargaining outcome and the allocation of gains between players. Thus, even though bargainers will not play direct revelation games in practice, analysis of these games is a useful tool to determine how well the bargainers can hope to do by adopting an appropriate strategic game.
The difference between the static direct revelation game analyzed by Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983) and the sequential direct revelation game considered here is that in the sequential game, the outcome functions not only determine the probability and terms of trade, but also dictate when trade is to take place. In the static game trade may occur only at time zero whereas in the sequential game trade may occur at different times depending on the players' reports of their private information. Thus, by analyzing sequential bargaining mechanisms, one is able to infer what the players' learning process is over time. Furthermore, by analyzing mechanisms that are sequentially rational, one can study what bargaining outcomes are possible when the bargainers are unable to make binding agreements.
The introductory discussion presented in this chapter considers the simplest type of sequential bargaining games in which the players' time preferences are described by known and fixed discount rates. I begin by characterizing the class of perfect bargaining mechanisms, which satisfy the desirable properties of incentive compatibility (i.e., each player reports his type truthfully), individual rationality (i.e., every potential player wishes to play the game), and sequential rationality (i.e., it is never common knowledge that the mechanism induced over time is dominated by an alternative mechanism). It is shown that ex post efficiency is unobtainable by any incentive-compatible and individually rational mechanism when the bargainers are uncertain about whether or not they should trade immediately. I conclude by finding those mechanisms that maximize the players' ex ante utility, and show that such mechanisms violate sequential rationality. Thus, the bargainers would be better off ex ante if they could commit to a mechanism before they knew their private information. In terms of their ex ante payoffs, if the seller's delay costs are higher than those of the buyer, then the bargainers are better off adopting a sequential bargaining game rather than a static mechanism; however, when the buyer's delay costs are higher, then a static mechanism is optimal.
The methodology of this paper is based on Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983) . I have freely borrowed from their insightful work in much of my analysis. Complete proofs for each proposition, even though many are only slightly different from the proofs found in Myerson and Satterthwaite, are given as an aid to the reader.
Formulation
Two parties, a buyer and a seller, are bargaining over the price of an object that can be produced by the seller at a cost s and is worth b to the buyer. The seller's cost s and the buyer's valuation b are also called their reservation prices, since they represent, respectively, the minimum and maximum price at which each party would agree to trade. Both the buyer and the seller have costs of delaying the bargaining process. Specifically, the value of the object is discounted in the future according to the positive discount rates ρ for the seller and σ for the buyer. Thus, the payoffs, if the bargainers agree to trade at the discounted price x at time t, are x -se -ρt for the seller and be -σ t -x for the buyer. Should the players fail to reach agreement, both of their payoffs are zero. Implicit in this formulation is the assumption that the bargainers discount future money at the same rate, so that at any time t the discounted payment by the buyer equals the discounted revenue to the seller. Without this assumption, it would Sequential bargaining mechanisms 3 be possible for the players to achieve an infinite payoff by having the player with the lower discount rate lend an arbitrarily large amount of money to the other player.
The buyer, although aware of his own valuation b, does not know the seller's cost of production s, but assesses this cost to be distributed according to the distribution F(s), with a positive density f(s) on [ , ] s s . Similarly, the seller knows his cost s, but only assess the buyer's valuation to be distributed according to the distribution G(b), with a positive density g(b) on [ , ] b b . Their discount rates and the distributions of the potential buyers and sellers are common knowledge. In addition, it is assumed that both the buyer and the seller are interested solely in maximizing their expected monetary gain.
To summarize, let áF,G,ρ,σñ be a sequential direct revelation game, where
b b , ρ = the seller's discount rate for the object, σ = the buyer's discount rate for the object.
In the revelation game, the players' actions consist of reports of their types, which are mapped into the bargaining outcome by the bargaining mechanism. Thus, the seller s reports that his cost is ′ ∈ s s s [ , ] , and the buyer b reports that his valuation is ′ ∈ b b b [ , ] . The revelation game is said to be direct if the equilibrium strategies of the players involve truthful reporting, that is, (s',b') = (s,b). The important role of direct revelation games stems from the fact that one can, without loss of generality, restrict attention to direct mechanisms. For any Nash equilibrium of any bargaining game, there is an equivalent direct mechanism that always yields the same outcomes. This well-known result is called the revelation principle. Given any mechanism M that maps reports into outcomes, and a set of equilibrium strategies x that maps true types into reported types, then the composition $
M M x
= o is a direct mechanism that achieves the same outcomes as the mechanism M.
For the revelation game áF,G,ρ,σñ, a sequential bargaining mechanism is the pair of outcome functions T(×|×,×) and x(×,×), where T (t|s,b) is the probability distribution that the object will be transferred to the buyer at time t, and x(s,b) is the discounted expected payment from the buyer to the seller, given that the seller and buyer report the reservation prices s and b, respectively.
Typically, randomization of the outcomes over time is not necessary. Without randomization, the outcome function T can be replaced by the function t(×,×), which determines the time of trade given the players' reports. A sequential bargaining mechanism, then, is the set of outcome functions át, xñ where t(s,b) is the time of trade and x(s,b) is the discounted expected payment, given that the seller reports s and the buyer reports b. Most bargaining mechanisms seen in practice require that the exchange of money and goods take place at the same time. Such a requirement is not restrictive in this model, because there is no benefit to be gained by exchanging money at a different time from the exchange of the good, since both players have identical time preferences for money. For reasons of tractability, I will frequently restrict attention to the simplified mechanism át, xñ.
Perfect bargaining mechanisms
The weakest requirements one would wish to impose on the bargaining mechanism áT, xñ in the direct revelation game are (1) individual rationality, that is, that everyone wishes to play the game, and (2) incentive compatibility, that is, that the mechanism induces truth telling. In addition, when the bargainers are unable to make binding commitments, one needs the further restriction of sequential rationality: It must never be common knowledge that the mechanism induced over time is dominated by an alternative mechanism. Bargaining schemes that satisfy incentive compatibility, individual rationality, and sequential rationality are called perfect bargaining mechanisms. The adjective perfect is adopted because of the close relationship between perfect bargaining mechanisms in the direct revelation game and perfect (or sequential) equilibria in an infinite horizon extensiveform game. It remains to be proven that a sequential bargaining mechanism is perfect if and only if it is a perfect equilibrium for some infinite-horizon extensive-form game. This issue will be addressed in future research.
In this section, I derive necessary and sufficient conditions for the sequential bargaining mechanism to be perfect. The incentive-compatibility and individual-rationality conditions were first established in Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983) , and later extended to the case of multiple buyers and sellers by Wilson (1982) and Gresik and Satterthwaite (1983) . It is important to realize that these properties are actually necessary and sufficient conditions for any Nash equilibrium of any bargaining game, since every Nash equilibrium induces a direct revelation mechanism, as mentioned in Section 8.2.
Incentive compatibility
In order to define and determine the implications of incentive compatibility on the sequential bargaining mechanism áT, xñ, it is convenient to divide each player's expected payoff into two components as follows. Let 
where S(s) is the discounted expected revenue and P(s) the discounted probability of agreement for seller s, and B(b) is the discounted expected payment and Q(b) the discounted probability of agreement for buyer b. Thus, the seller's and buyer's discounted expected payoffs are given by
respectively. Formally, the sequential bargaining mechanism áT, xñ is incentive compatible if every type of player wants to report truthfully his type; that is, for all s and s' in [ , ] s s and for all b and
Lemma 1. If the sequential bargaining mechanism áT, xñ is incentive compatible, then the seller's expected payoff U is convex and decreasing, with derivative dU/ds = -P almost everywhere on [ , ] s s ; his discounted probability of agreement P is decreasing; and
Similarly, the buyer's expected payoff V is convex and increasing, with derivative dV/db = Q almost everywhere on [ , ] b b ; his discounted probability of agreement Q is increasing; and
Proof. By definition, seller s achieves the payoff U(s) = S(s) -sP(s). Alternatively, seller s can pretend to be seller s', in which case his payoff is S(s') -sP(s').
In the direct revelation game, the seller s must not want to pretend to be seller s', and so we have
implying that U has a supporting hyperplane at s' with slope -P(s') £ 0. Thus, U is convex and decreasing with derivative (dU/ds)(s) = -P(s) almost everywhere, and P must be decreasing, which implies the first integral in (S) (I will use the Stieltjes integral throughout, so that any discontinuities in the probability of agreement are accounted for in the integral.) From integration by parts,
which, together with the definition of U, yields the second integral in (S). The proof for the buyer is identical.
Lemma 1 indicates the stringent requirements that incentive compatibility imposes on the players' utilities. In particular, it suggests how one can construct an incentive-compatible payment schedule x, given a probability of agreement distribution ℑ for which the seller's discounted probability of agreement P(s) is decreasing in s and the buyer's discounted probability of agreement Q(b) is increasing in b.
Lemma 2. Given the sequential bargaining mechanism áℑ, xñ such that P is decreasing, Q is increasing, and S and B satisfy (S) and (B) of lemma 1, then áℑ, xñ is incentive compatible.
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Proof. A mechanism is incentive compatible for the seller if for all s, s' Î [ , ]
s s ,
S(s) -sP(s) ³ S(s') -sP(s').
Rearranging terms yields the following condition for incentive compatibility:
From (S), we have
and from the fundamental theorem of integral calculus,
Adding the last two equations results in
where the inequality follows because the integrand (
s s , since P is decreasing. Hence, áT, xñ satisfies the incentive-compatibility condition (S'). An identical argument follows for the buyer.
Individual rationality
The sequential bargaining mechanism áT, xñ is individually rational if every type of player wants to play the game; that is, for all sin [ , ] s s and
In light of the monotonicity of U and V proven in lemma 1, any incentive-compatible mechanism áT, xñ will satisfy individual rationality if the extreme high-cost seller and low-valuation buyer receive a nonnegative payoff; that is, an incentive-compatible mechanism áT, xñ is individually rational if and only if U s ( ) ≥ 0 and V b
The following lemma describes how one can check whether or not a sequential bargaining mechanism is individually rational. It is convenient to state the lemma in terms of the simplified bargaining mechanism át, xñ rather than in terms of áT, xñ. Recall that for the sequential bargaining mechanism át, xñ, we have
( , )
Lemma 3. If the sequential bargaining mechanism át, xñ is incentive compatible and individually rational, then
where the expectation is taken with respect to s and b.
Proof. First note that from lemma 1, for át, xñ to be individually rational, it must be that U s
For the seller, we have 
where the first equality follows from lemma 1 and the second equality results from changing the order of integration. Similarly, for the buyer we have
Rearranging terms in (US) and (UB) and substituting the definitions for U(s) and
Lemma 4. If the function t(×,×)
is such that P is decreasing, Q is increasing, and (IR) is satisfied, then there exists a function x(×,×) such that át, xñ is incentive compatible and individually rational.
Proof. The proof is by construction. Let
where c is a constant chosen such that V b 
,
since P is decreasing. An identical argument holds for the buyer. Since V b ( ) = 0 and át, xñ is incentive compatible and satisfies (IR), it follows from lemma 3 that U s ( ) ≥ 0 . Thus, the bargaining mechanism át, sñ is incentive compatible and individually rational.
Sequential rationality
To understand how learning takes place in a sequential bargaining mechanism, it is best to interpret the direct revelation game as follows. At time zero (but after the players know their private information), the players agree to adopt a particular sequential bargaining mechanism át,xñ that is interim efficient. (Note that any interimefficient mechanism can be chosen as a Nash equilibrium in an appropriately defined "choice-of-mechanism" game.) The players then report their private information in sealed envelopes to a mediator, who will then implement the mechanism át,xñ. (Actually, a third party is not necessary, since the role of the mediator can be carried out by a computer programmed by the bargainers to execute the mechanism.) After opening the envelopes, the mediator does not announce the outcome immediately by saying something like, "Trade shall occur two months from now at the price of one thousand dollars," but instead waits until two months have passed and then announces, "Trade shall occur now at the price of one thousand dollars." The mediator must wait until the time of trade in order that the mechanism be sequentially rational, since otherwise the bargainers would have an incentive to ignore the mediator's announcement and trade immediately.
As time passes, the players are able to refine their inferences about the other player's private information based on the information that the mediator has not yet made an announcement about. Initially, it is common knowledge that the players' valuations are distributed according to the probability distributions F and G but after t units of time the common-knowledge belief's become the distributions F and G conditioned on the fact that an announcement has not yet been made; that is,
Thus, at any time τ > 0, the mechanism át,xñ induces an outcome function t(s,b) = t(s,b | F τ , G τ ) for all s and b. A mechanism át,xñ is sequentially rational if at every time τ ³ 0, the induced outcome function t(s,b | F τ , G τ ) is interim efficient, that is, there does not exist a mechanism át', x'ñ preferable to át,xñ at some time τ ³ 0 for all remaining traders and strictly preferred by at least one trader.
The following lemma relates the definition of sequentially rational to common-knowledge dominance.
Lemma 5. A sequential bargaining mechanism át, xñ is sequentially rational if and only if it is never common knowledge that the mechanism t(×,×| F τ , G τ ) that it induces over time is dominated by an alternative mechanism.
Proof. From theorem 1 of Holmström and Myerson (1983) , we know that a mechanism is interim efficient if and only if it is not common knowledge dominated by any other incentive-compatible and individually rational mechanism.
A necessary condition for a mechanism to be sequentially rational is that the bargainers continue negotiations so long as each expects positive gains from continuing. For the model here, since there are no transaction costs (only delay costs), this means that negotiations cannot end if there exists a pair of players that have not yet come to an agreement, but for which agreement is beneficial at some point in the future. Formally, for the bargaining mechanism át,xñ to be sequentially rational, it must be that for all potential players, a failure to reach agreement implies that there is some point beyond which agreement is never beneficial; that is, for all s and b,
s be
The condition s be 
Notice that the strength of this requirement depends on the relative magnitudes of the players' discount rates. When ρ > σ, then e To state this necessary condition in a lemma, it will be useful to define B as the set of potential traders for which trade is always beneficial at some time in the future; that is,
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Lemma 6. Any mechanism át,xñ that excludes trade over a nonempty subset of B violates sequential rationality.
Proof. Let N Ì B be the set for which trade never occurs. Then, at some point in time τ, the induced mechanism has t(s,b½F τ , G τ ) = ¥ for all remaining traders, which includes N. However, this mechanism is not interim efficient, since it is dominated by a mechanism that results in a positive probability of trade for some traders in N (a partially pooling equilibrium with this property will always exist).
I claim that sequential rationality is a necessary condition for rationality in games with incomplete information in which commitment is not possible. If a mechanism is not sequentially rational, then at some point in time it is common knowledge that all potential agents would prefer an alternative mechanism and hence this alternative mechanism will be adopted by the agents at that point in time. Thus, it would be inconsistent for the players to believe that the original mechanism would be carried out faithfully.
Necessary, and sufficient conditions for perfection
Lemmas I through 5 are summarized in the following theorem, which gives necessary and sufficient conditions for the sequential bargaining mechanism át,xñ to be perfect. 
Furthermore, for t such that P is decreasing and Q is increasing, there exists an x such that át,xñ is incentive compatible and individually rational if and only if
Finally, the mechanism át,xñ is sequentially rational if and only if it is never common knowledge that the mechanism it induces over time is dominated by an alternative mechanism.
Efficiency
The set of perfect bargaining mechanisms is typically quite large, which means that there are many extensiveform games with equilibria satisfying incentive compatibility, individual rationality, and sequential rationality. To narrow down this set, it is natural to assume additional efficiency properties. Three notions of efficiency, described at length by Holmström and Myerson (1983) , are ex post, interim, and ex ante efficiency. The difference between these concepts centers on what information is available at the time of evaluation: Ex ante efficiency assumes that comparisons are made before the players know their private information, interim efficiency assumes that the players know only their private information, and ex post efficiency assumes that all information is known.
Ex post efficiency
Ideally, one would like to find perfect bargaining mechanisms that are ex post efficient. The mechanism át,xñ is ex post efficient if there does not exist an alternative mechanism that can make both players better off in terms of their ex post utilities (after all of the information is revealed). (This is often called full-information efficiency in the literature. Holmström and Myerson (1983) term this "ex post classical efficiency" to distinguish it from their concept of ex post incentive-efficiency, in which incentive constraints are recognized.) Equivalently, for a mechanism to be ex post efficient, it must maximize a weighted sum [ , ] p p bp sp
The first-order condition is d dp bp sp π σ ρ
Checking the boundary conditions and assuming that s, b ³ 0 yields The following theorem demonstrates that it is impossible to find ex post-efficient mechanisms if the bargainers are uncertain whether or not trade should occur immediately. This result is shown in an example in Cramton (1984) . Theorem 2. There exists an incentive-compatible, individually rational bargaining mechanism that is ex post efficient if it is common knowledge that trade should occur immediately. However, an ex post-efficient mechanism does not exist if the buyer's delay cost is at least as great as the seller's and it is not common knowledge that gains from trade exist.
Proof. Suppose that it is common knowledge that trade should occur immediately. Then, three cases are possible: (1) (1) and (2),
0 where the integration is done by parts. In case (3),
Then, by lemma 4, there exists an x such that áp,xñ is incentive compatible and individually rational.
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Now, assume that it is not common knowledge that gains from trade exist and the buyer's delay cost is at least as great as the seller's (i.e. ρ £ σ). Notice that when ρ £ σ, we find that áp,xñ is ex post efficient if trade occurs without delay whenever there are positive gains from trade: 
Thus any incentive-compatible mechanism that is ex post efficient must have
and so it cannot be individually rational.
When the seller's delay cost is greater than the buyer's and it is not common knowledge that trade should occur immediately, a general proof that ex post efficiency is not achievable cannot be given due to the complicated expression for p* (s,b) in this case. However, analysis of examples (see Section 8.5) suggests that ex post efficiency is typically unobtainable.
Ex ante efficiency
The strongest concept of efficiency, other than ex post efficiency (which is generally unobtainable), that can be applied to games of incomplete information is ex ante efficiency. A player's ex ante utility is his expected utility before he knows his type. Thus, given the sequential bargaining mechanism áp,xñ, the seller's and buyer's ex ante utilities are
The mechanism áp,xñ is ex ante efficient if there does not exist an alternative mechanism that can make both players better off in terms of their ex ante utilities. Thus, for a mechanism to be ex ante efficient, it must maximize a weighted sum α 1 U + α 2 V of the players' ex ante utilities, where α 1 , α 2 ³ 0. For tractability and reasons of equity, I will assume equal weights (i.e., α 1 = α 2 = 1). (One might think that the assumption of equal weights is made without loss of generality, because the payoff functions here are additively separable in money and goods, and thus utility is transferable between players. Although this intuition is correct in a setting of complete information, it is false when there is incomplete information, because an ex ante transfer of utility will violate individual rationality for some players.) The use of unequal weights would not significantly change the results but would greatly complicate the analysis. If the bargainers were to choose a bargaining mechanism before they knew their types, it would seem reasonable that they would agree to a scheme that was ex ante efficient. It is generally the case, however, that the players know their private information before they begin negotiations, and therefore would be unable to agree on an ex ante-efficient mechanism, since the players are concerned with their interim utilities U(s) and V(b) rather than their ex ante utilities U and V. Nevertheless, it may be that the sequential bargaining mechanism is chosen by an uninformed social planner or arbitrator, in which case the selection of an ex ante-efficient mechanism would be justified. Alternatively, one might suppose that the choice of a bargaining mechanism is based on established norms of behavior and that these norms have evolved over time in such a way as to produce ex ante-efficient mechanisms. In situations where the choice of a bargaining mechanism does not occur before the players know their types or is not handled by an uninformed third party, ex ante efficiency is too strong a requirement. The weaker requirement of interim efficiency-that there does not exist a dominating mechanism in terms of the players' interim utilities U(s) and V(b)-is more appropriate.
The sum of the players' ex ante utilities for the bargaining mechanism áp,xñ is given by
A bargaining mechanism, then, is ex ante efficient if it maximizes this sum subject to incentive compatibility and individual rationality:
where p is chosen such that P is decreasing and Q is increasing. Multiplying the constraint by λ ³ 0 and adding it to the objective function yields the Lagrangian
.
which is easily maximized by pointwise optimization. The first-order condition is d dp dp It is worthwhile to point out that the requirement in the existence part of theorem 3 that c(×,1) and d(×,1) be increasing functions is satisfied by a large range of distribution functions. A sufficient condition for c(×,1) and d(×,1) to be increasing is for the ratio of the distribution and the density to be increasing. This is a local characterization of the monotone likelihood ratio property and is satisfied by many distributions, such as the uniform, exponential, normal, chi-square, and Poisson distributions.
I now prove that the ex ante-efficient mechanism typically violates sequential rationality, and hence show that bargainers who are unable to make binding commitments are worse off (in an ex ante sense) than bargainers who are able to commit to particular strategies. Proof. By theorem 3, the ex ante-efficient mechanism exists and is given by p α for some α > 0. Consider the set of traders who never trade under p α , but for whom trade is always beneficial at some point in the future: By our hypothesis, this set is nonempty. Thus, from lemma 6, the mechanism p α violates sequential rationality.
The case of uniform symmetric exchange: An example
To illustrate the theory presented in the earlier sections, it will be useful to look at an example. In particular, consider the case of uniform symmetric exchange in which both the seller's cost and the buyer's valuation are uniformly distributed on [0, 1] . Then, c(s,α) 
which are strictly increasing when α = 1, and so by theorem 3 we know that, for some α Î [0,1], the mechanism p = p α is ex ante efficient. The desired α is found by setting R(α) to zero, so that U s ( ) =V b ( ) = 0. Again, it will be useful to consider two cases depending on whether 
Performing the inner integration (assuming γ ¹ 1) yields 
after integration we have
is easily found numerically. The sum of the players' ex ante utilities is computed as follows:
The value of µ and the efficiency of the ex ante-efficient mechanism relative to the first-best (full-information) solution are shown in Figure 8 .1 and Figure 8 .2, respectively, as the ratio of the players' discount rates is varied from 0 to 1. Bargaining efficiency improves as the seller's discount rate is increased relative to the buyer's. When the players' discount rates are equal, 15.6 percent of the gains from trade are lost due to delays in agreement. This inefficiency decreases to zero as ρ ® ¥, illustrating theorem 2.
Conclusion
Two important features of any bargaining setting are information and time. Bargainers typically have incomplete information about each other's preferences, and therefore must communicate some of their private information in order to determine whether or not gains from trade exist. One means of communication is for the agents to signal their private information through their willingness to delay agreement: Bargainers who anticipate large gains from trade will be unwilling to delay agreement and so will propose attractive terms of trade that the other is likely to accept early in the bargaining process, whereas bargainers expecting small gains will prefer to wait for better offers from their opponent. In this chapter, I have described the properties of such a bargaining model, by analyzing a sequential direct revelation game.
Modeling the bargaining process as a sequential game, where the agents communicate their private information over time, has two main advantages. First, from the point of view of realism, one commonly observes bargaining taking place over time. Second, any static bargaining mechanism, because it does not permit the agents to learn about their opponent's preferences, must end with positive probability in a situation where gains from trade are possible and yet no agreement is reached. If both bargainers know that gains from trade exist, what prevents them from continuing negotiations until an agreement is reached? By introducing the time dimension, and hence allowing the bargainers to communicate through their actions over time, one is able to construct perfect bargaining mechanisms, in which the bargainers continue to negotiate so long as they expect positive gains from continuing.
When the bargainers discount future gains according to known and fixed discount rates, it was found that the bargainers may be better off (in terms of their ex ante utilities) using a sequential bargaining mechanism than a static scheme. This is the result of the time dimension introducing an additional asymmetry into the problem, which may be exploited to construct sequential bargaining mechanisms that ex ante dominate the most efficient static mechanisms. Even in situations where a static mechanism is ex ante efficient, it is unlikely that such a mechanism would be adopted by the bargainers, since it necessarily would violate sequential rationality.
The analysis presented here represents an early step toward understanding how agreements are reached in conflict situations under uncertainty. Several simplifying assumptions have been made in order to keep the analysis manageable. First, modeling the agents' time preferences with constant discount rates is an appealing example, but not an accurate description of all bargaining settings. (Fishburn and Rubinstein (1982) derive under which circumstances the discounting assumption is valid. In particular, they prove that any preferences over bargaining outcomes that are monotonic, continuous, and stationary can be represented by discounting provided the bargainers exhibit impatience over all outcomes except that of no agreement.) Second, the agents have been assumed to be risk neutral, but in many bargaining situations the agents' willingness to take risks is an important bargaining factor. Third, I have restricted attention to rational agents who can calculate (at no cost) their optimal strategies. Certainly, few agents are so consistent and calculating. With less-than-rational agents, an agent's capacity to mislead his opponent becomes an important variable in determining how the gains from trade are divided. Finally, I have assumed that the players' valuations are independent. However, in many settings the bargainers' valuations will be correlated, and so, for example, the seller's willingness to trade may be a signal of the valuation of the object to the buyer.
Although it would be useful in future research to weaken the simplifying assumptions made here, perhaps the most fruitful avenue for further study is the analysis of specific extensive-form bargaining games. The advantage of looking at specific extensive-form games is that the bargaining rules are independent of the probabilistic beliefs that the players have about each other's preferences. In a direct revelation game, on the other hand, the bargaining rule depends in a complicated way on these probabilistic beliefs. Because of this dependence, direct revelation games are not played in practice.
Can one find a strategic game that comes close to implementing the ex ante-efficient bargaining mechanism over a wide range of bargaining situations? Initial studies along these lines have been conducted by Cramton (1984) , Fudenberg and Tirole (1983) , and Sobel and Takahashi (1983) . All three papers consider a model in which only one of the bargainers makes offers. When the players' reservation prices are uniformly distributed on [0,1] and their discount rates are equal, it was found that this model results in 32 percent of the gains from trade being lost, as opposed to 16 percent being lost when the ex ante-efficient bargaining mechanism is adopted (Cramton (1984) ). Thus, the players' inability to commit to ending negotiations results in a bargaining outcome that is significantly less efficient than if commitment were possible.
Perhaps a better candidate for a strategic bargaining game that is nearly ex ante efficient is the game in which the bargainers alternate offers. This game was analyzed by Rubinstein (1982) in a setting of complete information, but an analysis with incomplete information has yet to be done. Of particular interest is the alternating-offers game as the time between offers goes to zero, because this strategic game represents a very general bargaining rule: At any time, a bargainer may make a new offer or accept the most recent offer of his opponent. It would be a pleasant surprise if such a reasonable bargaining game was nearly ex ante efficient over a variety of circumstances.
A second promising area for research is further study on the implications of sequential rationality to bargaining and to more general games of incomplete information. I intend to address this issue in depth in future research.
